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Abstract. In this study the determinants of entry and exit and the interrelationship between these 
market phenomena are investigated. We examine incentives, barriers, displacement and replacement 
for a panel data-set of 23 Dutch shoptypes for the 1981-1988 period. Results indicate that profit as 
a ratio of modal income, growth of consumer spending and growing unemployment are important 
incentives to enter and disincentives to exit. Requirements of floorspace and professional skills appear 
to reduce entry rates. We find evidence for entry and exit to interact but not to be simultaneously 
determined. The implication being that entry (exit) has a separate influence on exit (entry) next to 
market incentives and entry and exit barriers. 
Key words: Entry, exit, retailing, displacement, replacement. 
I. Introduction 
The selection process in which markets choose between established and entrant 
firms has a vital contribution to the transformation of industries over time. Industries 
with low birth and death rates are likely to be more vulnerable to an inadequate 
allocation of resources, limited innovativeness, and some form of formal or tacit 
collusion (Geroski and Jacquemin (1985)). The continuous flows of entry and exit 
represent a changing pool of potentially strong competitors. Beesley and Hamilton 
(1984) describe them as the seedbed of new activities from which will emerge the 
successful businesses and industries of the future. High barriers to entry and exit 
may therefore be serious impediments to dynamic market efficiency. 
Entry and exit rates of firms differ strongly across industries and over time 
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Van Herck (1984)). In empirical studies 
this variation in the intensity of the selection process by which incumbents are 
displaced by new entrants is explained by variation in profitability and market 
* The authors are indebted to Kees Bakker, Anne Bruijns, Henk Pays, Frans Pleijster and Her- 
man van Schaik of the EIM Small Business Research and Consultancy (EIM) for providing and 
elaborating the data. Helpful suggestions were received from Rene Belderbos, Christiaan Heij and 
Aad Kleijweg. We are especially grateful to the Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem (BSS) of EIM and the 
Central Registration Office (CRK) for placing the data at our disposal. Financial support from the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is acknowledged. 
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growth and by variation in the height of entry and exit barriers. A wide variety of 
entry barriers are supposed and found to influence entry decisions. A survey of a 
total of nineteen different market entry barriers can be found in Karakaya and Stahl 
(1989). Most studies incorporate the effects of profitability and market growth on 
rates of entry and exit, but the empirical evidence is mixed (see Section II). 
Entry and exit are interrelated market phenomena. Incentives to enter, like high 
profitability and strong market growth, are also disincentives to exit. Many entry 
barriers can also be considered exit barriers and vice versa (Eaton and Lipsey 
(1980), Shapiro and Khemani (1987)). Entry and exit may however not only be 
influenced by the same overall market conditions, but could also respond direct- 
ly to each other (Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992)). Entering firms may replace 
and/or displace exiting firms. Replacement occurs when exit causes entry. Exit 
may enhance opportunities for (potential) entrepreneurs to enter. Displacement 
occurs when entry cuuses exit. Entry may adversely affect survival chances of 
incumbent firms. Turnover of firms may be strongly influenced by the extent of 
these replacement and displacement effects. 
The aim of this paper is to extend and supplement empirical evidence on the 
processes of entry and exit as built up since Mansfield (1962). There are three 
contributions in this study to the investigation of entry and exit. First, it examines 
the causal interrelationship of replacement and displacement using an extensive 
and rich panel data-set at a low level of aggregation. Second, it is the first to explain 
determinants of entry and exit in a non-manufacturing industry, viz. retailing. The 
retail sector has an important contribution to the economy. It accounts for about 23% 
of the total number of economically active enterprises and for about 13% of total 
labour force in the Dutch private sector in 1988 (source: Bode (1990)). The total 
number of economically active enterprises in retailing (92,000) in the Netherlands 
is twice of that in manufacturing (46,700) (source: EIM (1991)).’ Third, it stands 
out in that it concentrates on a comparatively simple entrepreneurial activity. The 
setting up or closing down of a venture in retailing generally demands much less 
capital, time and knowledge investment than in manufacturing. This is due to the 
more limited size of retail ventures and the more clearly structured retail market 
environment resulting from the limited impact of innovations, complex network- 
dependencies and international competition. Hence, retailing can be regarded as a 
promising testing area for establishing the influence of market incentives on entry 
and exit rates. 
In Section II we examine patterns of firm entry and exit in Dutch retailing and 
discuss previous findings in the empirical entry and exit literature. We provide 
a survey of the effects of profitability and market growth on entry and exit as 
Employment shares of the retail trade in the private sector do not differ much across countries 
in Western Europe. The total number of employees in the retail sector in 1988 in France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were (percentage of total employment in the private 
sector between brackets): 1,639$X)0 (12.1), 2,254,OOO (ll.S), 527,700 (12.6) and 2,615,OOO (12.8), 
respectively (source: Vogelesang, Broadbridge and Zanderighi (1992)). 
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found in 44 studies. Section III is used for a discussion of the determinants of 
entry and exit that are used in this study. In Section IV we pay special attention 
to the problems related to the estimation of displacement and replacement effects. 
In Section V we present the data and empirical results. Section VI is used for 
concluding remarks. 
II. Patterns of Entry, Exit and Their Determinants 
The average annual entry and exit rates for Dutch shoptypes (retail industries) for 
the 1981-1988 period can be found in Table I.* We compare these figures with 
those presented by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) for U.S. manufacturing 
for the 1963-1982 period. Patterns and determinants of entry and exit in this 
sector have been studied intensively in the past decades. The average annual entry 
and exit rates are 0.083 and 0.091 in Dutch retailing, while they are 0.081 and 
0.074 in U.S. manufacturing.3 The lowest and highest average entry rates in Dutch 
shoptypes are 0.035 for tobacco shops and 0.154 for florists. The corresponding 
figures for U.S. manufacturing industries (at two-digit level) are 0.043 for tobacco 
(SIC 21) and 0.121 for instruments (SIC 38). The lowest and highest average exit 
rates in Dutch retailing are 0.052 for bicycles and 0.138 for furnishing stores with 
mixed assortment. The lowest average exit in U.S. manufacturing is again found 
in tobacco (SIC 21) at 0.047 and highest average exit in apparel (SIC 23) at 0.095. 
Entry and exit rates in Dutch retailing have a correlation coefficient of 0.78 (over 
one year periods, see Table II). Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson also found entry 
and exit to be highly correlated. They found a coefficient of 0.27 over five year 
periods. One may expect correlation between average entry and exit rates to be 
somewhat higher in retailing than in manufacturing. This is a consequence of the 
lower probability of survival of new small firms in retailing (38.4 percent for a 
ten yew-period, U.S. data) versus those in manufacturing (46.9 percent) (source: 
Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989)). 
Empirical studies of the determinants of entry and exit have received growing 
attention since Or-r’s influential paper (Orr (1974)). Table III presents a total of 
44 studies with characteristics of the data-set used (country, number of industries, 
period, measure of entry or exit). All these studies are strictly confined to ~LZ~U- 
&cfu+rg i&&&s, with the exception of Highfield and Smiley (1987), where a 
small proportion of non-manufacturing industries is incorporated into the data-set. 
There has been considerable progress in the empirical entry and exit literature since 
Mansfield’s 1962 article: First, data for several countries and for highly disaggre- 
gated industries have been used. Some of the more recent studies also use panel 
Throughout this study entry rate (ENTRY) is defined as the total number of firms entering from 
period t - 1 to t divided by the total number of firms in period r - 1. The exit rate (EXIT) is the total 
number of firms leaving from period t - 1 to t divided by the total number of firms in period t - 1. 
’ The figures for Dutch retailing relate to the 23 shoptypes discussed in the present paper. 
’ This has also led to important progress in the theoretical line of research (see e.g. Hopenhayn 
(1992) and Jovanovich and Lath (1989)). 
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TABLE I. Entry, exit, profitability and demand growth in shoptypes 
Supermarkets with butcher’s shop 0.079 
Butchers 0.07 1 
Greengrocers 0.083 
Dairy shops 0.05 1 
Fish shops 0.113 
Bakers 0.060 
Confectioners 0.092 
Tobacco shops 0.035 
Liquor stores 0.085 
Textiles mens wear 0.140 
Shoes 0.071 
Household goods 0.087 
Furnishing stores, mainly fumitute 0.100 
Furnishing stores, mainly clothing material 0.140 
Furnishing stores, mixed assortment 0.109 
Paint, glass, wall-paper 0.049 
Ironmongers/do-it-yourself shops 0.052 
Bicycles 0.041 
Photographer’s shops 0.082 
Watches, gold, silver 0.080 
Druggists 0.053 
Florists 0.154 
Pet shops 0.089 
Mean 0.083 
0.098 1.63 0.006 
0.079 1.09 -0.000 
0.094 0.88 0.034 
0.081 0.75 0.014 
0.107 0.85 0.005 
0.062 1.60 0.011 
0.107 1.27 0.014 
0.070 0.84 -0.035 
0.111 0.54 -0.010 
0.125 1.82 0.002 
0.073 1.26 0.019 
0.089 0.85 0.004 
0.105 1.92 -0.015 
0.125 1.41 -0.014 
0.138 1.91 -0.015 
0.082 1.09 0.006 
0.066 1.02 0.006 
0.052 0.88 -0.020 
0.079 1.27 0.062 
0.083 1.30 -0.018 
0.060 1.17 0.05 1 
0.132 0.67 0.026 
0.086 0.61 0.006 
0.091 1.16 0.006 
Note: The variables ENTRY, EXIT, PMI and DCS stand for the shoptype’s entry rate, 
exit rate, average profit (divided by modal income) and the growth of consumer spending, 
respectively. Figures are averages over the 1981-1988 period. 
data. The use of panel data is of great importance in examining a process as highly 
dynamic as entry and exit (Schmalensee (1989)). Second, different types of entry 
and exit have been examined. One may expect that incentives and barriers differ 
between diversifying and specialist entry, between domestic and foreign entry and 
between entry by small and by large firms. Third, the empirical relevance of a 
large number of different entry and exit barriers has been investigated. Fourth, 
displacement and replacement effects tend to be incorporated in recent studies. See 
Geroski (199lb) for a more general exposition of the causes and effects of entry 
and exit. 
Most studies incorporate two incentives to enter (or disincentives to exit): a 
measure of profitability and a measure of market growth. Table III presents the 
reported significance of the effects of profitability and growth on entry and exit in 
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TABLE lI. Correlations of entry, exit, profitability and demand growth 
ENTRY EXlT P&K1 Plu-1 DCS-r 
ENTRY 0.783* 0.219* -0.119 0.070 
EXIT 0.617’ 0.122 -0.072 -0.133 
PMI-, 0.180’ -0.148’ -0.23 1’ 0.182* 
PlU-, 0.039 -0.012 0.185* 0.154* 
DCS-r 0.108 -0.155* 0.422’ 0.144 
Note: Correlations to the left of the diagonal are adjusted for industry 
effects: the per shoptype mean of the variable is subtracted before the 
correlations are estimated. Correlations to the right of the diagonal are 
not adjusted for industry effects. Estimates which are significant at a 
S%-significance level are denoted by *. The variable PRI stands for 
average profit divided by equity. See also note to Table I. 
the 44 studies. This overview provides an adequate benchmark against which to 
compare our results on the effects of profitability and market growth on entry and 
exit in the retail sector. A summary of the findings is presented in Table IV. In 20 out 
of 35 empirical results a significant positive effect of (a measure of) profitability 
on (a measure of) gross entry is found. A significant negative effect is only found 
by Wagner (1994) when using a reweighted regression approach. In 28 out of 37 
empirical results a significant positive effect of (a measure of) market growth on 
(a measure of) gross entry is found. No study reports a significant negative effect. 
The results for gross exit are somewhat less clear-cut. Only 4 out of 10 results show 
a significant negative effect of profitability on gross exit, while 3 results show the 
opposite. The results for market growth are more straightforward: 5 out of 9 results 
are negative and significant, while no study finds a significant positive effect. 
Some studies use net entry (gross entry minus gross exit) as dependent variable. 
Significant positive effects of (a measure of) profitability and market growth on (a 
measure of) net entry are found in 8 out of 13 and 13 out of 18 empirical results, 
respectively. In both cases only one result shows a significant negative effect. 
III. The Determinants of Entry and Exit in Retailing 
In this paper we incorporate two measures of profitability in the entry and exit 
equations. The first is profit divided by modal income (PMI). Most (potential) 
entrepreneurs in retailing are small independents. About 88,600 out of 92,000 
retail firms in the Netherlands have less than 10 employees, while 3,200 have 10 
to 100 employees and 200 have more than 100 employees (source: EIM (1991)). 
As a small independent’s profit generally equals his income (before taxes), we 
may consider PM1 to be a good indicator for the attractiveness to enter a certain 
shoptype. A more traditional measure of profitability is profit as a ratio of equity 
(PRI). This corresponds to usual measures of return on investment. The effect of 
TABLE JIB. Empirical studies into the determinants of entry and exit 
Study Country Jnd Period Mea Prof Grow Remarks 
Mansfield (1962) USA 4 1916-59 GRE ++ n 
GRX- n 
Marcus (1967) USA 17 1951-55 GRX - n 
err (1974) Canada 7 1 1964-67 NNE 0 Ol+ 
Duetsch (1975) USA 307 19.58-67 NRE o/+ ++ 
Gotecki ( 1975) UK 44 1958-63 NRE n ++ 
NREn ++ 
Gorecki (1976) Canada 62 1964-67 NNE 0 0 
NNEn ++ 
Hirschey (1981) USA 87 1947-72 NRE O/- ++ 
Masson and Shaanan (1982) USA 37 1958-63 GSE + 0 
Creedy and Johnson (1983) UK 16 1966-77 GRE + n 
Shapiro (1983) Canada 131 1972-76 GNE + + 
GNE + 0 
GNX O/+ 0 
GNX 0 0 
Duetsch (1984) USA 95 1963-72 NNE + ++ 
Hause and Du Rietz (1984) Sweden 39 1954-68 GEE n + 
GREn + 
Hilke (1984) USA 16 1950-66 GSE 0 ++ 
Hamilton (1985) Scotland 86 1976-80 GRE 0 + 
GREO + 
Kessides (1986) USA 262 1972-77 NNE * ++ 
Khemani and Shapiro (1986) Canada 143 1972-76 GNE ++ ++ 
GRE 0 + 
MacDonald (1986) USA 46 1976-82 GEE 0 ++ 
GEX n 0 
Masson and Shaanan (1986) USA 26 1958-63 GSE + ++ 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) Canada 141 1970-79 GNE + ++ 
GNEO 0 
Highfield and Smiley (1987) USA 60 1976-81 GRE ++ ++ 
Liebennan (1987) USA 38 1952-82 GDE n ++ 
Masson and Shaanan (1987) USA 43 1964-67 NNE O/+ 0 
Schwalbach (1987) Germany 122 1977-82 GSE ++ ++ 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) Canada 143 1972-76 GNE + ++ 
GNX 0 0 
Khemani and Shapiro (1988) Canada 143 1972-76 GNE i-•+ -I--I- 
GNEO + 
GNE ++ ++ 
GNE+ 0 
Acs and Audretsch (1989a) USA 247 1978-80 NRE O/+ ++ 
Acs and Audretsch (1989b) USA 238 1976-82 GRE 0 ++ 
Chappell, Kimenyi and Mayer USA 330 1972-77 NNE O/++ ++ 
(1990) 
Jeong and Masson (1990) Korea 62 1976-81 NRE 0 0 
Kessides (1990) USA 250 1972-82 NNE * ++ 
Diversifying entry 
Specialist entry 
Domestic entry 
Foreign entry 
Domestic entry 
Foreign entry 
Domestic exit 
Foreign exit 
Jndependent entry 
Dependent entry 
Specialist entry 
Specialist exit 
Domestic entry 
Foreign entry 
Diversifying entry 
Displacement 
Specialist entry 
Diversifying entry 
Domestic entry 
Foreign entry 
Small entry 
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TABLE III. Continued 
Study Country Ind Period Mea Prof Grow Remarks 
Dunne and Roberts (1991) USA 386 1963-82 GRE ++ 
GSE 0 
GRX ++ 
GSX + 
Flynn (1991) USA 298 1978-84 GNX -- 
Geroski (199la) UK 95 1983-84 NSE + 
NSE 0 
Mata (1991) Portugal 73 1982-86 GNE + 
GNE 0 
Schwalbach (1991) Germany 79 1983-85 GRE + 
Sleuwaegen and Belgium 109 1980-84 GRE + 
Dehandschutter(l991) GRX - 
VonderFehr(l991) Norway 97 1981-85 GNE ++ 
++ 
++ 
- 
0 
0 
-I- 
+ 
-+-I- 
-- 
0 
GNE 0 0 
Yamawaki (199 1) Japan 135 1980-84 NRE O/+ 
Rosenbaum and Lamort USA 213 1972-82 GRE ++ 
(1992) GRX 0 
Mata (1993) Portugal 68 1982-86 GNE 0 
GNE 0 
Rosenbaum (1993) USA 241 1972-82 NRE ++ 
Audretsch and Acs (1994) USA 117 1976-86 GNE n 
Santarelli and Sterlacchini Italy 21 1986-89 GRE 0 
(1994) 
-t-i- 
+-+ 
+ 
0 
++ 
0 
+-I- 
Displacement 
Domestic entry 
Foreign entry 
Small entry 
Large entry 
Replacement 
Displacement 
Specialist entry 
Replacement 
Diversifying entry 
Replacement 
Replacement 
Displacement 
Specialist entry 
Diversifying entry 
Wagner (I 994) Germany 29 1979-88 GEE O/-- +/++ Small entry 
Note: Measures of entry and exit, GDE = Gross Dummy Entry (1 in case of entry else 0); GEE 
= Gross Employment share of Entry; GEX = Gross Employment share of exit; GNE = Gross 
Number of Entering firms; GNX = Gross Number of exiting firms; GRE = Gross Rate of Entry; 
GRX = Gross Rate of exit; GSE = Gross Sales (or production) share of Entry; GSX = Gross Sales 
(or production) share of exit; NNE = Net Number of Entering firms; NRE = Net Rate of Entry; 
NSE = Net Sales share of Entry. 
Effects of Prof(itability) and Grow(th), -- i-value below -2.5; - &value between -2.5 and 
- 1.5; 0 t-value between - 1.5 and +1.5; + r-value between +1.5 and +2.5; ++ t-value above +2.5; 
n not incorporated. 
Displacement: Entry is determinant of exit; Replacement: Exit is determinant of entry; Mea = 
measure of entry or exit; Ind = number of industries. 
* Kessides (1986,199O) estimates a non-linear specification, leading to industry-dependent effects 
of profitability on entry. 
demand growth on entry and exit is investigated by the variable DCS: the growth 
rate of real consumer expenditure on goods primarily sold in the shoptype. The 
variables PMI, PRI and DCS are one period lagged to adjust for the time period 
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TABLE IV. Summary of empirical studies listed in Table III 
Effect of profitability Effect of growth 
-- - 0 •+ ++ Total -- - 0 -I- ++ Total 
Gross Entry 1 0 14 11 9 35 0 0 9 10 18 37 
Gross Exit 1 3 3 2 1 10 4 14009 
NewEntry 0 1 4 6 2 13 0 14 1 12 18 
Note: See note to Table III. In case the study has presented evidence for both a significant and 
a non-significant effect (eight cases for the effect of profitability and two cases for the effect 
of growth), we have chosen for the significant one. 
necessary for (potential) entrepreneurs to react to incentives. See Table II for the 
correlations between these three measures and the entry and exit rates. 
We also incorporate UN, the level of unemployment (in l,OOO,OOO persons), 
and the change in this variable (DUN).5 A high level of unemployment or an 
increase in unemployment may have a positive effect on entry. Workers who are 
or become unemployed may consider becoming self-employed in the retail sector. 
Retailing is a comparably simple entrepreneurial activity which requires only a 
limited financial investment. Also, it may have a negative effect on exit. High levels 
of unemployment or strong increases in this level may deter shopkeepers to exit 
because of the unfavourable conditions on the labour market. Being or becoming 
unemployed can therefore be interpreted as incentive to enter and disincentive to 
exit. However, one has to be careful when interpreting the effect of the (change in 
the) level of unemployment because unemployment data do not always provide an 
adequate picture of the tension on the labour market and because the great majority 
of unemployed never consider a new firm start-up or let alone reach the stage of 
starting their own retail business. The variables UN and DUN are one period lagged 
in the CVZQ equation. We assume that shopkeepers’ exit decisions are affected by 
contemporaneous labour market conditions but that there is a lag between being or 
becoming unemployed and starting a retail venture. 
Three indicators of the level of entry and exit barriers are considered. First, 
the degree of franchising, DF, is included. This variable is defined by the number 
of franchisees divided by the total number of firms. Entry by an independent 
firm may be expected to be less attractive in a shoptype in which franchising 
has proved a successful instrument of market penetration. The importance of the 
degree of franchising as entry barrier may however be limited because the viability 
of market niches is seldomly affected by an increase in the degree of franchising. 
An important feature of franchising is a high degree of similarity of the shops and 
franchisees therefore may lack the specialization needed for successful exploitation 
of market niches. The extent to which franchising may be considered to be an exit 
’ See Hudson (1989) and Storey (1991) for investigations into the effect of unemployment on 
entry and exit. 
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barrier is also uncertain. Small independents will be confronted by competition 
from franchisees. The franchiser may however provide independents who threaten 
to succumb to this competitive pressure the opportunity of becoming franchisees as 
well. That is, firms which suffer from the competition by franchisees may very well 
profit from the competition between franchisers to obtain new outlets. A second 
indicator of the level of entry and exit barriers is small store presence, SSP. A 
large small store presence indicates that entry and exit barriers are low because a 
high sales volume does not seem to be prerequisite for entrepreneurial activity. We 
define SSP as the ratio of sales by firms with less than 10 employees to total sales. 
A positive effect of small store presence on entry and on exit is expected. Acs 
and Audretsch (1989a) however find for U.S. manufacturing that small firms do 
not tend to enter those industries in which there is already a considerable presence 
of small firms. They claim that ‘flexible specialization’ may have enabled small 
firms to enter and exist in markets where they previously would have experienced 
severe scale disadvantages. A third indicator of the level of entry and exit barriers is 
floorspace requirement. Retail business which needs extensive floorspace, FS, may 
be more difficult to set up. High floorspace requirement indicates high financial 
investments and problems in finding an appropriate establishment. This constitutes 
an important entry barrier in retailing. It may also be considered an exit barrier 
because the amount of floorspace is often closely linked to high investments in 
inventory and long tenancy agreements.6 We measure floorspace in 10,000 square 
meters. The variables DF, SSP and FS are all one period lagged in the AMY 
equation. We assume that a decision to enter is based on market characteristics of 
one year before, while a decision to exit is affected by contemporaneous market 
characteristics. 
IV. Effects and Estimation of Displacement and Replacement 
Some recent studies, like Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) and Sleuwaegen and 
Dehandschutter (1991), consider the effects of displacement and replacement. 
Displacement is the positive effect of entry on exit. There are two possible causes 
for this effect. First, new entry may lead to stronger competitive pressures which 
lead to exit (entry ‘forces’ exit). Second, independents who seriously consider to 
exit may wait for new entrants to take over their business. Replacement is the 
positive effect of exit on entry. There are again two possible causes. First, exit 
may provide additional market room for (potential) entrepreneurs to enter (exit 
‘allows’ entry). Second, entrepreneurs may wait to enter until they are offered the 
opportunity to take over a shop (and its clientele). 
Displacement implies that entry is an explanatory variable in the exit equation, 
while replacement implies that exit is an explanatory variable in the entry equation. 
In case exit (entry) can be treated as exogenous to the entry (exit) equation we use 
Caves and Porter (1976) provide evidence, using a sample of 3 10 businesses for the 1970-1973 
period, that high fixed investments prevent low-return businesses to exit. 
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the Seemingly Unrelated Relations (SUR) estimation technique. If however entry 
and exit are simultaneously determined, i.e. exit (entry) is endogenous to the entry 
(exit) equation, we choose a simultaneous equations estimation technique like 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS). The question now is whether exit (entry) can 
be treated as exogenous versus endogenous in the entry (exit) equation. In case 
of exogeneity the equations can be interpreted as reduced form equations, This 
implies that the entry and exit rates cannot be expressed as functions of market 
incentives and barriers only. 
We test the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the exit (entry) rate in the entry (exit) 
equation in two ways.7 Using the Hausman approach (see e.g. Godfrey (1988), sec. 
1.6 or MacKinnon (1992), sec. 9)) we estimate the model using Three Stage Least 
Squares (3SLS) and using SUR. Both estimation techniques are consistent under the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity, but SUR is the more efficient one. SUR is however 
not consistent under the alternative hypothesis of endogeneity, while 3SLS is. The 
Hausman test statistic is defined as (&ss~s - &sm)‘( &s~s - Ssu~)-‘(&s~s - 
&sm), where &3s~s and &sm stand for the parameter vector estimators using 
3SLS and SUR, respectively. The matrices 5’3s~~ and Ssu~ are the corresponding 
estimators of the covariance matrices.* The Hausman test statistic is asymptotically 
x2-distributed under the null hypothesis with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of elements of the parameter vector. Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) use 
the Spencer-Berk test statistic (see Kmenta (1986), sec. 13.6).9 This test involves 
calculating exit’s (entry’s) expected value by regressing exit (entry) on all the 
predetermined variables in the system and by evaluating the estimated i-value 
of the coefficient of this expected value when included next to the observed exit 
(entry) using OLS estimation. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity this value 
is r-distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of observations minus 
the number of variables in the model. 
We also incorporate the one period lagged entry and exit rates in the model. 
The lagged exit rate (EXIT-r) affects the entry rate when replacement is not 
immediate but taking place after one time period. We also expect the lagged entry 
rate (ENTRY- 1) to have a positive effect on the entry rate. Gort and Konakayama 
(1982) argue that perceptions of profit opportunities are positively related to the 
successful experience of others in the market. Entrepreneurial activity may very 
well tend to be autocorrelated: the incidence of entry may stimulate (potential) 
’ MacKinnon (1992, p. 126) claims that one should not interpret these tests as tests on exogeneity. 
One really tests whether possible endogeneity causes SUR estimates to be inconsistent. 
’ The procedure runs into difficulties when &s~s - Ssu~ is not positive definite, which is often 
the case in practice. We did not encounter this problem in any of the tests. 
’ Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) report an insignificant Spencer-Berk exogeneity test statistic. 
This implies that exit (entry) can be treated as exogeneous to the entry (exit) equation in their sample. 
Their final conclusion is however incorrect: they claim that entry and exit do not appear to be causally 
related but that they are just part of the same market process. Exogeinity does however not imply 
that entry does not cause exit and vice versa. It implies that entry and exit are not simultaneously 
determined. 
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entrepreneurs to consider entry as well. Got-t and Konakayama refer to this as the 
demonstration effect. Similar arguments for the incorporation of the lagged entry 
and exit rate in the exit equation can be used.” 
The empirical model (fixed effects included) to be investigated is: 
ENTRYit = aoi + alPMI+l t u~PRI+~ t u~DCS+~ t a4UNtml 
t@IJNt-1 t %Db,t-~ t ~7SSPi,t-1 t %FS+1 
ted=ITit t aloEXK,t-1 t d3TRYi,t-1 t &lit (1) 
EXITit = bo; t biPMI+t t bzPRI+t t b3DCS;,t-1 t ktIJNt 
tbsDUNt t &jDFit t t+=‘i,t t bsFSit 
t&ENTRY;t t ~toENTRY+l t chFiXITi,t-1 t &zit 
where ENTRY = Entry rate; EXIT = Exit rate; PM1 = Profit divided by modal 
income; PRI = Profit divided by equity; DCS = Change in real consumer spending; 
UN = Number of unemployed; DUN = Change in the number of unemployed; DF 
= Degree of franchising; SSP = Small store presence; FS = F’loorspace require- 
ment. 
V. Data and Empirical Results 
In this study a data-set of 23 Dutch shoptypes for the period 1981-1988 is used. 
This implies a total of 184 data-points. The source of the data is an ongoing 
panel of independent, mainly small Dutch retailers called ~e~~~~~~~g~u~e~~~g~~y~- 
teem (interfirm comparison system) which is operated by the EIM Small Business 
Research and Consultancy (EIM) in Zoetermeer.ll On average a data-point is com- 
puted using observations from about seventy individual retail stores. The consumer 
spending and modal income data are from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
in Voorburg,12 unemployment data were retrieved from the UN Monthly Bulletin 
lo In their study of the interaction of entry and exit rates, Johnson and Parker (1994) also investigate 
displacement, replacement and demonstration effects. They use a different terminology for these 
effects, viz. competition and multiplier effects. They apply a vector autoregression approach without 
exogenous variables to entry and exit rates in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and find support for 
the existence of both these effects. 
” In Cat-me and Thurik (1994,1995) a more extensive data-set is used of 36 shoptypes covering a 
longer time period. However, the limited availability of data of the degree of franchising and of small 
store presence confines our data-set to 23 shoptypes for the 1981-1988 period. 
‘* There were no data available on small store presence for three shoptypes: “bakers”, “confec- 
tioners” and “pet shops”. These shoptypes consist of small firms (less than 10 employees) for nearly 
100%. Small store presence is taken to be unity in every period for these shoptypes, Data on small 
store presence were available for four shoptypes for 1988 only: “greengrocers”, “florists”, “fish 
shops” and “tobacco shops”. In these shoptypes small firms accounted for at least for 85% of the 
sales in that year. Small store presence in the years 1980-1987 is taken to be equal to the 1988-level. 
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of Statistics and data on entry and exit of retail establishments were gathered by 
the Central Registration Office (CRK) in The Hague. Data on the total number of 
franchisees were available only for 1980,1982 and 1988. We used an interpolation 
for the intermediate years. 
Table V presents the empirical results with fixed effects (shoptype dummies) 
assumed in all models (use is made of the SAS-module SYSLIN). The first two 
columns contain the estimation results when displacement and replacement effects 
are not taken intoaccount (ug = uto = att = bg = bto = btl = 0). We incorporate 
the displacement and replacement effect in the next two columns by considering exit 
(entry) to be endogenous to the entry (exit) equation (~I,-J = utt = bto = bl r = 0) 
We proceed to test whether SUR estimation is viable by using the Hausman and 
Spencer-Berk test statistics. Both statistics support the null hypothesis of the entry 
rate to be exogenous to the exit equation and vice versa. The Hausman statistics 
are 10.204 for the entry equation @value is 0.33) and 4.994 for the exit equation 
(p-value is 0.83), while the Spencer-Berk statistics are 0.564 @-value is 0.57) and 
-1.377 (j-value is 0.17), respectively. Columns five and six contain the results 
when the model is re-estimated using SUR (again alo = utl = bto = btt = 0)). In 
the next columns we present estimation results when the one period lagged entry 
and exit rates are incorporated into the model. The Hausman and Spencer-Berk 
test statistics again point to (pair-wise) exogeneity of the entry and exit rate. The 
Hausman statistics are 10.530 for the entry equation b-value is 0.48) and 2.430 
for the exit equation @value is 0.99), while the Spencer-Berk statistics are 0.889 
b-value is 0.37) and - 1.265 b-value is 0.20), respectively. Therefore, we also 
present estimation results using SUR in the last two columns. 
The SUR estimation results give strong support for the positive effects of prof- 
itability and demand growth on entry and the negative effects of these variables on 
exit. Entry and exit rates in retailing seem to be more sensitive to market incen- 
tives than in manufacturing when considering the mixed results for manufacturing 
industries (see Section 2). The surplus of profit over modal income (PMI-1) and 
the growth rate of real consumer spending for goods primarily sold in the shoptype 
(DCS- 1) have positive and significant effects on entry and negative and significant 
effects on exit. See Table I for the average values of PMI-t and DCS-t in the 23 
shoptypes. Return on investment (PRI- 1) has no effect on either entry or exit rates. 
This indicates that (potential) shopkeepers place higher value on the reward for 
their labour input than on the reward for their capital investments when considering 
entry or exit. 
The level of unemployment (UN) does not have the expected positive effect on 
the entry rate nor the negative effect on the exit rate. This may be a consequence of 
the level of unemployment acting as a business cycle indicator next to the shoptype- 
specific market growth (DCS). The change in the level of unemployment (DUN) 
does however have the expected effects. This variable may be a more reliable 
indicator of opportunities on the labour market during the 1980s than the level of 
unemployment because of the consistent high number of structurally unemployed 
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TABLE V. Empirical results for entry and exit models 
Variable 
SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS SUR 
ENTRY EXIT ENTRY EXIT ENTRY EXIT ENTRY EXIT ENTRY EXIT 
PMI-, 
PRI-l 
Da-1 
ENTRY 
EXIT- 1 
ENTRY-, 
0.019* -0.012 0.031* -0.012 0.028* -0.019* 
(2.4) cw (4.8) (1.7) (4.7) (3.9) 
0.003 0.006 -0.009 0.004 -0.OCI8 0.009 
WI (0.4) W) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) 
0.026 -0.042 o.otB* -0.045 0.087* -0.080’ 
(0.7) (1.3) (2.7) (1.3) (3.0) (3.1) 
0.010 0.028* -0.014 0.022* -0.017* 0.013 
Cl.11 G-9 (1.6) cm (2.3) (1.7) 
0.043* -0.011 0.032* -0.018 0.023* -0.025’ 
(2.9) (0.9) (2.3) (1.4) (2.1) (2.4) 
0.195* 0.141; 0.042 0.101 0.024 0.019 
WI (2.7) (0.7) (1.7) (0.4) (0.4) 
-0.106 0.036 -0.138 0.049 -0.160* 0.130* 
(1.1) vu (1.W (0.7) e-3 (2.4) 
-0.888’ -0.309. -0.654’ -0.464 -0.379’ 0.023 
(4.2) cm (3.1) (1.5) (2.4) c0.a 
1.060; 1.108* 
(5.1) (17.5) 
0.215 0.720* 
(0.9) (16.0) 
0.029* -0.006 0.026’ -0.017* 
(4.5) WI (4.5) (3.5) 
-0.012 0.002 -0.011 -0.010 
WI 011 VW RW 
0.088* -0.054 0.085* -0.082* 
(2.5) (1.5) (3.0) (3.3) 
-0.013 0.014 -0.015* 0.011 
(1.7) (1.4) WI (1.4) 
0.036* -0.008 0.023. -0.023* 
(2.5) (0.4) c2.1) W) 
0.060 0.092 0.039 0.009 
U.0) (1.3 (0.7) ew 
-0.086 0.020 -0.105 0.091 
(1.1) wa (1.5) (1.6) 
-0.518’ -0.508 -0.309 -0.033 
WI (1.3) (1.9) WI 
0.992* 1.031* 
(4.3) (14.9) 
0.040 0.700: 
@.ll (13.6) 
-0.158 0.336: -0.165 0.205; 
(1.3) WI (1.8) WI 
0.249* 0.115 0.263’ -0.159* 
CW K’.@ (3.5) (2.4) 
l%E 16.508’ 12.980. 2.797* 1.670* 7.750’ 5.508* 1.953; 0.907 3.494* 2.733* 
r 0.848 0.830 0.916 0.880 0.911 0.894 0.924 0.875 0.920 0.900 
System- R2 0.664 0.738 0.945 0.791 0.940 
%kwmxul 2 10.204 4,994 10.530 2.430 
$encer-Bmk 0.564 - 1.377 0.889 - 1.265 
Note: All models are estimated with fixed effects. Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics. Coefficients 
which are significant at a 5%-significance level are denoted by *. The test statistics &a, ~i?,~“~~ and 
rsFxer-a& stand for the F-test on the hypothesis of the absence of shoptype specific effects (fixed effects) 
and the Hausman x*-test and Spencer-Berk t-test on the hypothesis of exogeneity of ENTRY in the exit 
equation and of EXIT in the entry equation. The coefficient r stands for the estimated correlation between 
the observed entry (exit) rate and the estimated entry (exit) rate. The variables UN, DUN, DF, .SSP and FS 
are one period lagged only for the entry equation. 
in the Netherlands during that period. Workers who have only recently become 
unemployed may also be more able and motivated to use self-employment as an 
alternative to being unemployed than people who have had no working experience 
for a longer time period. The results show that an increase in the number of 
unemployed appears to lead to more entry while it seems to prevent exit. 
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The degree of franchising (DF) has no significant effects on entry or exit when 
the displacement and replacement effects are included in the model. The positive 
effect of the degree of franchising on the entry and exit rate when displacement 
and replacement are not taken into consideration, does indicate that part of the 
replacement and displacement process originates from the growing market pene- 
tration of franchisers. Small store presence (SSP) has a significant effect on the 
entry and exit rate only in case of SUR-estimation with lagged dependent variables 
excluded. The presence of many small stores appears not to be attractive to new 
entrants, which is in accordance with results found by Acs and Audretsch (1989a) 
for U.S. manufacturing. At the same time we do find that the exit rate is higher, 
ceteris paribus, in shoptypes dominated by small stores. The net exit in shoptypes 
dominated by small stores leads to the general decline of small store presence in 
retailing. l3 The floorspace requirement (FS) has a significant negative effect on 
entry, while it has no significant effect on exit. One can conclude that floorspace 
requirement (or more generally investment requirement) obstructs entry. 
The effects of many other entry and exit barriers are adjusted for by the inclusion 
of fixed effects. The value and significance of the shoptype dummy-coefficients 
therefore may provide some additional information on the (relative) ease of entry 
and exit over the shoptypes. One can divide the 23 shoptypes into 9 shoptypes with 
relatively high requirements of professional skills and 14 shoptypes with only lim- 
ited requirements. The first group consists of “supermarkets with butcher’s shop”, 
“butchers”, “bakers”, “confectioners”, “liquor stores”, “bicycles”, “photographer’s 
shops “, “watches, gold, silver” and “druggists”. In case of SUR estimation without 
displacement and replacement effects the mean dummy in the entry equation is 
0.122 for this first group, while it is 0.185 for the other 14 shoptypes (i-test on 
equality of means: -2.21). For the mean dummy in the exit equation the figures are 
0.043 and 0.076 (t-test: - 1 S7). In case of SUR estimation with lagged dependent 
variables included the mean dummy in the entry equation is 0.046 for the first group 
and 0.064 for the second group (t-test: - 1 S6). The respective mean dummies in 
the exit equation are -0.027 and -0.028 (i-test: 0.07). That is, requirements of 
professional skills appear to reduce entry rates (but not exit rates) and therefore 
may slow down adjustment processes in retailing. 
The coefficient of the exit rate incorporated in the entry equation is very close 
to unity, independent of whether 3SLS or SUR is used as estimation technique. 
Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) also found this result for U.S. manufacturing using 
the SUR estimation technique. If no information on incentives or barriers would be 
available one could consider the exit rate to be a good predictor of the entry rate in 
a shoptype. The extent to which the entry rate exceeds the exit rate, i.e. the extent 
to which net entry is positive, depends on the attractiveness of the shoptype and 
barriers impeding new entrants to occupy the market room created by exit. There is 
” See Carree, Potjes and Thurik (1993) for a study into the determinants of the declining small 
store presence found in Japanese retailing. See Nooteboom (1986) for a general discussion of the 
‘ousting of smallness’ in retairmg. 
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support for the demonstration effect: the lagged entry rate has a significant positive 
effect on the present period’s entry rate. 
The treatment of the entry rate as endogenous or exogenous variable, has- an 
important impact on the effect of this variable in the exit equation: ihe coefficient 
becomes significant in case SUR is used, while it is not significant using the 
3SLS estimation technique. The Hausman and Spencer-Berk test statistics provide 
support for the use of the SUR estimation technique. This is evidence for entry to 
influence exit while they are not simultaneously determined. The lagged exit rate 
has a significant positive effect on the present period’s exit rate. This could again 
be related to a demonstration effect. Firms that change their range of activities, 
shifting to another shoptype, may be followed by competitors. 
VI. Conclusions 
The determinants of entry and exit in retailing are the subject of research in this 
paper. Retailing is an interesting testing area for these determinants not only because 
of its importance in the economy but also because of its presumed sensitivity to 
market incentives due to the limited amount of investments and skills needed 
when compared to other sectors. We find lagged profitability and lagged market 
growth in this sector to have a significant positive effect on entry and a significant 
negative effect on exit. Growing unemployment also seems to stimulate entry and 
to obstruct exit. Evidence is found for shoptypes dominated by small stores to 
have lower entry rates and higher exit rates. The variable describing the extent of 
floorspace requirement has a significant negative effect on the entry rate suggesting 
that it acts as an impediment to new firm entry. We also find evidence for the entry 
rate to be lower in shoptypes with relatively high requirements of professional 
skills. This provides support for the recent decision made by the Dutch Ministry 
of Economic Affairs to abolish a wide variety of legal requirements in retailing in 
order to improve dynamic market efficiency. 
There is strong statistical support for the incorporation of exit (entry) as deter- 
minant of entry (exit). Shoptypes with high entry rates also have high exit rates. 
Such high turnover may however not only result from low entry (exit) barriers, 
but also from entrants replacing or displacing exiting firms. We find evidence for 
these displacement and replacement processes. There is however no evidence of 
simultaneity of the entry and exit rates. This implies that Equations (1) and (2) 
can be interpreted as reduced form equations. As a consequence, the entry and 
exit rates cannot be expressed as functions of market incentives and barriers only. 
Studies which do not take into account the separate influence of entry on exit, i.e. 
displacement, and the separate influence of exit on entry, i.e. replacement, will 
therefore suffer from an omitted variable bias. 
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